I have previously established normalized natural deduction systems for the full sentential relevant logics DW and DJ. I have also previously noted that the style of natural deduction system involved does not extend to the stronger logic TW, nor to its positive fragment TW+. However, it does apply to some other fragments of TW. In this paper, I establish normalized natural deduction systems for the {→}-and {→, &}-fragments of the relevant logics: TW, RW, T and R. I also make use of these to establish decidability for the {→}-fragments of TW and RW.
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The rough consequence logic of Chakraborty and Banerjee, based on the modal logic S5, developed to handle rough equality, can also be thought of as a "possibility logic" as it has the property: A ⇔ S5 M A. This paper proves a number of interesting results in the logic as well as for other rough consequence (or possibility) logics based on weaker modal logics. It also shows some limitations of rough consequence logics as a means of handling rough equality.
Coalgebras are of increasing interest in computer science for their use in modelling certain types of data structures and state-transition systems, in particular the ever popular object-oriented programming paradigm.
There have been many different logics developed for reasoning about coalgebras of particular functors, most involving modal logic. We define a modal logic for coalgebras of polynomial functors, extending Rößiger's logic [2] , whose proof theory was limited to using finite constant sets, by adding an operation from Goldblatt [1] . From the semantics we define a canonical coalgebra that provides a natural construction of a final coalgebra for the relevant functor. We then give an infinitary axiomatization and syntactic proof relation that is sound and complete for countable constant sets. It is sometimes suggested that the sequence of Modal Logics: S0.5, S1, S2, S3, S4, S5 is not as "natural" as the sequence: S0.5, S0.9, S2, S3, S4, S5. In both sequences there is an ascending chain of validity inclusion so that, as far as theorems go: S0.5 ⊆ S1 ⊆ S2 ⊆ S3 ⊆ S4 ⊆ S5 and S0.5 ⊆ S0.9 ⊆ S2 ⊆ S3 ⊆ S4 ⊆ S5. But there is also the inclusion sequence:
The idea is that it is more natural to have S0.9 in the sequence than S1. This idea is often prompted by a consideration of the axiom systems for these logics. But there is also an interesting sequence when we consider the Kripke semantics or the Model-set/model-system semantics for these systems. In the semantic sequence the simplest natural sequence does not contain either S0.9 or S1, just:
In this paper we will look at what might lie behind this idea of a "natural" sequence of modal logics.
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We investigate the semantics of the modal logic of agency and ability (LAA) proposed by Elgesem [1] . LAA is a classical bi-modal logic with the axioms: EA → A, EA ∧ EB → E(A ∧ B), EA → CA, and ¬C , where E and C are, respectively, the modal operators of agency and ability. For the semantics Elgesem adopts selection function models S = W, f, v , where W is a set of possible worlds, f is a function from W × 2 W to 2 W , and v is a valuation function. The modal operators are evaluated by the following clauses
where |A| = {w : w |= A}. Moreover f satisfies the conditions:
It is immediate to see that ¬C⊥ is valid in the above class of models. We propose a class of neighbourhood models W, N C , N E , v where
, and N E ⊆ N C . We prove that this class of models characterises LAA, but ¬C⊥ is not valid. Hence LAA is incomplete with regard to the intended selection function semantics. We show how to modify the selection function semantics to regain completeness. We point out that the resulting semantics relies on non-normal worlds. Accordingly we argue that an alternative semantics can be given in terms of multi-relation Kripke models with non-normal worlds. Finally we discuss some philosophical issues about the interpretation and appropriateness of the three types of semantics. In [4] we give a family of finite-valued implicational logics L n . This paper looks at the corresponding infinite-valued logic L ∞ . Using the completeness results for the implicational fragment of Abelian logic [3] we can easily give an axiomatization of L ∞ with the sole rule being reverse modus ponens. However, we resort to the results of [1, 2] to show that the axioms in the result above also give an axiomatization of L ∞ with the sole rule being modus ponens.
in the completeness proof is to show that we can construct two complex values that coincide exactly on a given ideal (with some additional properties) in this Brouwer algebra.
The presence of the union-constructor, however, complicates all results and proofs significantly. We lose the distributivity of the Brouwer-algebra, and several additional axioms are needed. The difficulty arises from the fact that the combination of disjoint unions with sets, multisets and lists introduces the need for restructuring, i.e. non-trivial equivalences between subattributes.
In particular, if the union-constructor is absent, a subset of the rules is complete for the implication of ordinary functional dependencies, but this does not hold, if the union constructor is present. Furthermore, if the union-constructor is only coupled with the list-constructor, a similar result can be achieved, which captures the gist of XML treated as a complex value datamodel [2] . The metaphor of information flowing has been used to motivate and explain a number of quite difference models of information acquisition and exchange, including those of situation theory and dynamic epistemic logic. I will describe a recent suggestion by van Benthem to combine two conceptions of information flow in one formal framework, using modal logic, and compare it with an alternative approach using the notion of an infomorphism (also known as Chu-morphism) between classifications.
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Penrose has been puzzled about what Gödel's results show about our differences from machines. I demonstrate in this paper that the crucial difference is that, while computers can deal with formulas, only humans can deal with facts. That arises because a Turing machine cannot determine how its formulas are to be interpreted, while we can.
The detail of the proof involves a technical re-working of Gödel's first theorem using Hilbert's epsilon calculus. The universal statement which we can know to be true, but which systems such as PM cannot derive, is equivalent to an elementary statement involving a certain epsilon term. When we choose the standard model for Arithmetic we make that epsilon term refer to a finite number, even though, because of the possibility of non-standard models, there is no formal proof, within the system, that the relevant epsilon term does refer to such a number. The finiteness of the referent of the epsilon term, in the standard model, means there is a finite proof of the associated universal statement.
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In natural language texts indicators of modality occur that we would like to analyse as modal operators in logic. However, the modalities in texts interact in a way that is hard to transform in a compositional way into a translation into ordinary modal logic. I will introduce the basic phenomena of modal interaction by giving examples and propose an indexed form of modal logic that can account for them in a compositional way. The logic proposed obtains a dynamic semantics: formulas of the indexed modal language are interpreted as update operators on information states. Several results about the logic proposed will be discussed, most prominently a decidability result.
Examples of modal interaction:
(1) A lion might come in. It would eat you first. It will eat me later. (2) A lion might come in. It could eat you first. It could eat me first instead.
Here the modality in each second sentence depends on the situation introduced by the first modality. Then the modalities in the third sentences interact with the previous modalities in distinct ways: 'sequentially' in (1), but more 'parallel' in (2) .
